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Midcourse Corrections 
Roger Bernhardt  
The Suborned Subescrow 
 
The first time I read the opinion in Markowitz v Fidelity Nat’l Title Co. (2006) 142 CA4th 
508, 48 CR3d 217, reported at p 402, I was convinced that it was wrong. Indeed, each time I 
reread it, that same feeling arose, although by nowI have become persuaded that it really was 
decided correctly. 
Markowitz sued Fidelity because, as part of a refinancing—where Fidelity was supposed to 
have an old deed of trust held by the original sellers reconveyed and replaced with a new one in 
favor of the refinancing lender—it (Fidelity) recorded the new one but did not get the old one 
reconveyed, thus leaving Markowitz’s title subject to both the old and the new liens. While his 
major adversaries were the holders of the old deed of trust, who were refusing to release it 
without more money, he also sued Fidelity for (among ther things) breach of escrow contract 
and breach of escrow agent fiduciary duties. 
What caught my attention—and what seemed wrong to me—was the court’s conclusion that 
Markowitz had no standing to complain about Fidelity’s behavior because he was not a party to 
the instructions given to it. The sole giver of instructions to Fidelity, the court said, was City 
National Bank, the refinancing lender. How, I asked myself, could Jill Culver, the named escrow 
agent, possibly record a deed of trust against Markowitz’s title without an instruction from 
Markowitz—or even worse, when Markowitz was not even a party to the escrow? 
The answer is that she couldn’t do so, if she were r ally an escrow agent—but she certainly 
could do so, if she weren’t functioning as an escrow agent. In this transaction, Culver was 
operating as a “subescrow” agent; she had been hired by the bank to record the new deed of trust 
(and reconveyance of the old), and to disburse funds when her employer (Fidelity) was prepared 
to issue a title policy insuring the bank. This was not a conventional loan escrow where lender 
and borrower submit their respective documents and valuables for transfer to the other on the 
occurrence of the mutually stated conditions. Culver was working solely as an agent of the bank 
in this transaction and needed no instructions from Markowitz to do what was required of her. 
Subescrows are a phenomenon of the southern part of the state and one with which we in the 
north are largely unfamiliar. Their existence is connected to the widespread operation of 
independent escrow companies in the south and the attend nt worries that those facilities 
generate when large sums of money have to be entrusted somewhere; large reputable title 
companies, on the other hand, are safe depositories for money even when they are not 
functioning as true escrows. 
There is a good explanation of this in State v PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP (2005) 125 CA4th 
1219, 1279, 23 CR3d 529, rev’d on other grounds (2006) 39 C4th 1220, 48 CR3d 144, which is 
unciteable (but, I hope, quotable): 
An understanding of how ORTC [Old Republic Title Company] operates in Southern 
California is helpful. There, escrow transactions are typically handled by independent escrow 
companies. Buyers, sellers and lenders alike contract directly with the escrow company for 
escrow services. The parties to a transaction address their escrow instructions to the escrow 
company, which in turn performs the instructions without any involvement of companies such as 
ORTC. Buyers, sellers and borrowers have no direct contact with ORTC. However, lenders 
deposit their funds with ORTC. This latter arrangement is called a subescrow, although it is a 
depositary relationship and not an escrow. A senior vice-president of Old Republic declared that 
lenders often are “unwilling to deliver loan funds to independent escrow companies because 
those companies frequently lack the size or longevity associated with solvency and liquidity.” 
Thus, they insist on depositing their funds with a company such as ORTC.... The trial court noted 
that in Southern California, buyers were parties to escrows conducted through independent 
escrow companies, not ORTC. The situation in Southern California was very different because 
the buyers were not customers of ORTC and had not entered into any agreements with ORTC. 
Up north, on the other hand, the ownership of escrows by title companies eliminates that 
particular need, although I understand that they are often used in refinancings by a lender to 
guarantee that its loan funds are not disbursed until its deed of trust is recorded and insured, all 
of which can be done by a title company as its agent, without the need for a “formal” escrow 
involving the borrower. (Indeed, I believe City National Bank would have done the same up 
north as it did in Markowitz down south.) 
The term “subescrow” is quite misleading: Subescrows have nothing to do with escrows. 
There was no escrow in the Markowitz loan transaction. The Markowitzes signed and delivered a 
loan agreement, note, and deed of trust directly to Ci y National Bank; they did not sign escrow 
instructions and did not go through an escrow. They m rely had to hope that the bank would not 
misuse what they had signed before giving them the money it had promised. The bank, for its 
part, sent the promised money to its trusted agent, Fidelity, with instructions to disburse it when 
stated conditions were met. Since it was only following the instructions of one party, Fidelity 
functioned not like an escrow agent, listening to tw  principals, but only as an ordinary agent 
obeying its single master, City National Bank. There was no “one person” and “another person” 
as Fin C §17003 contemplates for true escrows. 
It is easy to forget that a transaction, even a big one, can be accomplished without an escrow. 
X can give her deed or mortgage to Y without opening up an escrow to do it. Y can record that 
document (if it was properly signed and notarized) without needing instructions from X to do so, 
at least as long as it is not done in the teeth of an instruction not to record it. If Y can record the 
deed/mortgage to him, he can also ask Z, his agent, to record it for him (or to do so when Z is 
satisfied that some other conditions have also beenmet). Z can do all this without any need to get 
confirmation from X, and can call it a subescrow when it does so. 
The reason I said (at the start of this column) that I reached the wrong conclusion every time I 
read the opinion is because nowhere in the opinion is this distinction ever really made. The court 
mentions that a subescrow was involved, but then—throughout all of its reasoning—speaks as if 
a true escrow were involved, constantly referring to Fidelity as an escrow agent and citing 
authorities dealing with escrow agent responsibilities. Given that Fidelity was a lender’s agent, 
not an escrow agent for the lender and borrower, none of those references or arguments applies. I 
only hope that others will not misread those statements to think that they can safely be used to 
guide real escrow agents’ conduct. 
Much of the trouble starts with the fact that California escrow law itself does not make much 
sense. Historically, a valid escrow required an irrevocable delivery to the escrow agent. If the 
grantor deposited the deed with any right to recall it, the receiver took the deed as his agent—and 
not as an escrow agent—which meant that there was no relation back of the second delivery to 
the first and that the grantor’s death, before the second delivery by the agent to the grantee, 
terminated the agent’s authority and rendered any second delivery meaningless. (Thus, in all 
those cases where the grantor said to the agent, “Deliver this to the grantee on my death, unless I 
change my mind,” delivery was sure to fail, and peopl  would not find that out until the grantor 
was dead and it was too late to do it right.) California cases still have that requirement (Hayden v 
Collins (1905) 1 CA 259, 263, 81 P 1120): 
[I]t is absolutely essential to the validity and effectiveness of a deed in escrow that it be delivered 
to a third person for the grantee, beyond any power in the grantor to recall or revoke it. The 
grantor must clearly and unequivocally evidence an intent and purpose to part with the 
possession and control of the deed for all time. In short, the delivery and transfer must be 
irrevocable. 
If that were the general rule for escrows, and escrow officers took that principle seriously, no 
escrow would ever be valid. Few depositors ever intend to waive the right to change their minds 
when depositing papers into escrow, and most escrow agents have a policy of refusing to accept 
irrevocable instructions. Commercial escrows are not really escrows at all, in the historic sense 
of the word, because the parties to them only have a conditional intent, i.e., to go through with 
the deal only if the other side performs. But it hardly matters, because if they have an underlying 
enforceable contract, they are bound to perform whether they want to or not. No seller has a 
defense to the buyer’s specific performance action by saying, “But I don’t want to perform the 
contract or deliver my deed.” The obligation of contract replaces the need for proper intent in 
delivery. 
This would not be a problem if our courts had described the situation by saying that there 
either must be an irrevocable delivery or an enforceable contract for a second delivery from the 
escrow agent to the grantee to be valid and relate b ck. But instead, we have made it sound like 
one rule all jumbled up. Thus, Witkin says (12 Witkin, Summary of California Law, Real 
Property §306 (2005)): 
The prevailing rule ... is that the grantor and grantee must enter into a valid and binding 
contract in order to make an irrevocable deposit. If here is no such contract, the grantor can 
recover the deed from the escrow holder at any time before the condition is performed.... 
I suspect escrow officers pay as little attention t that statement as to the earlier one about 
irrevocable intent, and do not attempt to determine the validity (or even the existence) of any 
underlying contract between the parties. 
The discrepancy between these two rules, for me, is best illustrated in Holland v McCarthy 
(1916) 173 C 597, 603, 160 P 1069, in which the court stated that the enforceable contract 
requirement does not apply “where the transaction is ot to consummate a contract of sale, but 
for the purpose of effecting a gift. Such transactions are governed by a different rule, and a 
contract is not an essential part thereof.” This sounds like saying, “If you have a contract, you 
need a contract, but not if you don’t have a contract.” The real explanation is not that you need to 
have a contract in order to have an escrow, but that even when you don’t have an escrow 
(because of conditional intent), the contract underlying it can be specifically enforced anyway, as 
long as the contract is specifically enforceable. 
Learning About New York Mortgage Practice 
While I was preparing this column, I happened to receive a copy of Stein on New York 
Commercial Mortgage Transactions (LexisNexis 2006), by Joshua Stein, a Latham & Watkins 
attorney whom I previously persuaded to comment for us on nonrecourse carveouts (see the 
Editor’s Take on Aozora Bank, Ltd. v 1333 N. Cal. Blvd. (2004) 119 CA4th 1291, 15 CR3d 340, 
in 27 CEB RPLR 134 (Sept. 2004)). Practitioners who engage in commercial real estate deals 
often enough brush up against New York practice, so I examined this work to see what it told me 
about how this situation would play out there. It didn’t cover this particular transaction (they 
have attorney-supervised “closings” rather than escrows most of the time), but I did conclude 
that it was a generally useful book, and one that I will frequently turn to. 
 
